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The Safest Bet: A Comprehensive Review
of the Fall of PASPA and the Rise of Sports
Betting
Daniel Boswell*
In May of 2018, the United States Supreme Court held in Murphy
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association that a federal
prohibition on sports gambling was in violation of the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. In the wake of
the decision, many commentators have opined that the opinion,
authored by Justice Alito, may have serious implications on
contentious political issues ranging from marijuana legalization
to sanctuary cities. While the decision left state legislatures with
the authority to permit sports gambling, it did not affirmatively
close the door on federal oversight—a topic of much recent
debate. This note will explore potential regulatory options at
Congress’ disposal in a post-Murphy world.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of
1992
America’s sports gambling landscape was changed forever in the
wake of a late-1980’s scandal involving Major League Baseball’s all-time
hits leader, Pete Rose. The Dowd Report, a 1989 investigatory piece
authored by Special Counsel to the Commissioner John Dowd, asserted
that Rose had placed wagers on a number of Cincinnati Reds baseball
games during the 1987 season, while he was the Reds’ manager.1 As a
result, Pete Rose was effectively banished from Major League Baseball

1

See generally JOHN DOWD, DOWD REPORT (1989).
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for life, and a cloud formed over the integrity of professional sports.2
Subsequent legislative action would attempt to alleviate growing national
hysteria and scrub the stain of the Rose scandal from American sports.3
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), was
first introduced in the United States Senate by Sen. Dennis DeConcini in
late February of 1991.4 Following its proposal, various Senate and House
Judiciary subcommittees convened to discuss the “national problem”5:
sports gambling. A 1991 Senate report explained that the “purpose of
[PASPA] is to prohibit sports gambling conducted by, or authorized under
the law of, any State or other government entity . . . to maintain the
integrity of our national pastime.”6 PASPA gained popularity with support
ranging from the commissioners of the four major sports leagues to
evangelical leaders.7 A year and a half after its proposal, the Senate sent
PASPA to the House of Representatives with overwhelming approval;
PASPA was soon thereafter endorsed with approval by the House.8 On
October 28th, 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed PASPA into law.9
PASPA made it unlawful for state governments to “sponsor, operate,
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law . . . [a] betting, gambling,
or wagering scheme based . . . on one or more competitive games in which
amateur or professional athletes participate . . . or on one or more
performances of such athletes in such games.”10 This blanket prohibition
was followed by multiple exceptions pertaining to PASPA’s
See Ross Newhan, Pete Rose Barred From Baseball by Giamatti: Reds' Manager Can
Seek Reinstatement From Life Ban in Year; He Denies He Bet on the Sport, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-25/news/mn-1036_1_pete-rose.
3
See id.; see also Michelle Minton, Legalizing Sports Betting in the United States,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://cei.org/content/legalizingsports-betting-united-states (“Without federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to
spread on a piecemeal basis and ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.”); see also
David Purdum, Sports betting legalization: How we got here, ESPN (May 22, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23561576/chalk-line-how-got-legalized-sportsbetting (then-U.S. Rep. and former NBA player Tom McMillen explaining that “It was
very non-controversial. It was right in the Pete Rose aftermath”).
4
S. 474, 102nd Cong. (1992).
5
Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns
Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 9 (1992).
6
S. REP. NO. 102-248 (1991); see also Will Green, The Scope of PASPA: Parsing the Intent
of the Federal US Sports Betting Law, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Nov. 23, 2016),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/12205/paspa-scope-and-intent-us-sports-betting/
(indicating that the intent of PASPA was to strictly prohibit the expansion of sports
gambling into new sports).
7
See S. REP. NO. 102-248.
8
The United States Senate passed PASPA with 88 votes in favor and 5 votes against in
the Roll Call Vote for the 2nd Session of the 102nd Congress.
9
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
10
Id.
2
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applicability.11 First, PASPA would not apply to any State that had a Stateconducted gambling scheme in operation at any time between January 1st,
1976 and August 31st, 1990.12 Second, PASPA would not apply to any
State that had a gambling scheme authorized by statute as of October 2nd,
1991, and had conducted such a scheme at any time between September
1st, 1989 and October 2nd, 1991.13 Third, New Jersey was specifically
afforded a one-year grace period to authorize sports gambling, therefore,
allowing the state to avoid PASPA’s blanket prohibition.14
Senator Bill Bradley—a former New York Knicks guard and two-time
NBA champion—was an early co-sponsor of PASPA, providing the bill
with the jumpstart it needed to gain popularity. Though PASPA passed
through Congress with thumping majorities in both the Senate and the
House, it did have detractors. Senator Chuck Grassley championed states’
rights.15 Therefore, his initial concern focused on PASPA’s state-specific
“grandfathering” scheme for exemptions from PASPA’s blanket
prohibition.16 Specifically, Senator Grassley believed that PASPA’s
scheme to prohibit sports gambling unfairly discriminated against many
states in favor of just a few.17
Senator Grassley also initially flagged PASPA as a federalism issue,
warning against the precedent the legislation would establish by allowing
the Federal Government to prohibit state revenue raising programs.18
Grassley argued that “determinations of how to raise revenue have
typically been left to the States.”19
Finally, Grassley voiced a concern that PASPA’s grandfathering
provisions would create a single-seller market for lawful sports
gambling.20 The resulting federal monopoly, Grassley argued, would
slight the majority of the states by unfairly reserving an already multibillion-dollar industry for just a few states.21

See id. § 3704(a).
Id. § 3704(a)(1).
13
Id. § 3704(a)(2).
14
Id. § 3704(a)(3); see also Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has
an Equal Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 1, 6 (2017).
15
138 CONG. REC. 12,974 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
16
Id. at 12,974-75.
17
Id. (“This bill purports to restrict gambling on sporting events by prohibiting certain
States from conducting sports lotteries, and it does so by discriminating against many
States . . . and preferring four States.”).
18
See S. REP. NO. 102-248 (1991).
19
Id.
20
See id.
21
See id.
11
12
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B. New Jersey’s Challenges to PASPA
Senator Grassley’s concerns about the constitutionality of PASPA
proved prescient. On August 7, 2012, the four major professional sports
leagues, plus the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) filed
suit against then-New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, alleging that the
enactment of a 2012 New Jersey law permitting regulated sports betting in
licensed locations within the state violated PASPA prohibitions.22 The
District Court granted an injunction for the sports leagues, and New Jersey
appealed to the Third Circuit. Ruling in favor of the sports leagues, the
Third Circuit held in pertinent part that: (1) PASPA did not violate the
equal sovereignty doctrine;23 and (2) PASPA did not violate the anticommandeering restrictions of the Tenth Amendment.24
However, the Third Circuit planted a seed in the anti-commandeering
section of its opinion that would become the basis of future litigation.25 In
a discussion on whether PASPA prohibits New Jersey from repealing its
own anti-sports wagering provisions, the court stated that PASPA does not
“prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering.”26 Thus,
the Third Circuit left open the possibility that New Jersey could repeal its
own prohibition on sports betting at licensed casinos and racetracks
throughout the state without running afoul of PASPA.27
In 2014, the New Jersey state legislature took the message
promulgated by the Third Circuit (even citing the court’s dicta on state
authority to repeal prohibitions on sports betting)28 by passing a revised
version of its 2012 bill into law.29 Rather than authorizing sports gambling
within the state—as the 2012 bill attempted to do—the revision acted as a
repeal to a 1977 New Jersey law banning sports gambling.30 Following
Governor Chris Christie’s signature of the bill on October 7, 2014, New

See Compl., NCAA v. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d 551, 561 (D.N.J. 2013).
See Shelby County. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013); see also NCAA v. Governor
of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[F]ar from singling out a handful of states for
disfavored treatment, PASPA treats more favorably a single state.”).
24
See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 237 (“We hold that PASPA does not violate the anticommandeering doctrine.”).
25
See id. at 232 (“But we do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its
ban on sports wagering.”).
26
Id.
27
See id. (emphasis added); see also Minton, supra note 3.
28
S. 2460, 2014 Leg., 216th Sess. (N.J. 2014) (highlighting the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of PASPA where it “stated that it does ‘not read PASPA to prohibit New
Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering’”).
29
Id.
30
Id. (The 1977 bill prohibited gambling by anyone under age 21 within the state and
prevented betting on sports teams from New Jersey).
22
23
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Jersey was intent on accepting sports bets at its racetracks and casinos as
early as the following month.31
The major sports leagues filed suit against New Jersey again, just three
days after Governor Christie signed the bill into law.32 In spite of the Third
Circuit’s admonition that PASPA did not bar New Jersey from repealing
its own sports gambling prohibitions, the sports leagues maintained that
the New Jersey state legislature had violated PASPA by doing just that.33
Both the District Court and the Third Circuit found in favor of the sports
leagues.34 However, the make-up of the Third Circuit’s panel in this case
was likely essential to obtaining Supreme Court review.35 The judge who
wrote the majority opinion in Christie I—ruling against New Jersey—
found in favor of New Jersey in Christie II.36 As a result, the Third Circuit
granted New Jersey’s request for en banc review of the case.37
Although the en banc review was facially unsuccessful for New
Jersey, as the full panel of Third Circuit judges voted 9-3 in favor of
affirming the prior ruling, the nature of the review was a win for New
Jersey.38 On October 7, 2016, New Jersey filed its appeal with the United
States Supreme Court.39 And on June 27, 2017, the Supreme Court
announced that it would agree to hear New Jersey’s appeal of the Third
Circuit’s decision.40

C. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association41
On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court heard the oral arguments
for the State of New Jersey and the major sports leagues.42 The parties’
31
See David Purdum & Ryan Rodenburg, The odds of legalized sports betting: New
Jersey
vs.
the
leagues,
ESPN
(May
14,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/22605881/the-odds-legalized-sports-betting-newjersey-vs-leagues.
32
See Compl., NCAA. v. Christie, 61 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.N.J. 2014).
33
See id.
34
See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 261 (3d Cir. 2015) (“PASPA, by its
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by law sports gambling, and the 2014 [New Jersey]
Law does exactly that.”).
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
See id. (en banc).
38
See id.
39
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Christie v. NCAA, No. 16-476, 2016 WL 5940876,
at *6 (3d Cir. 2016).
40
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. granted, Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
41
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (2018) (When Phil Murphy was sworn in as
governor of New Jersey, “Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association” was
changed to “Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.”).
42
See Oral Argument Transcript, Murphy, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (No. 16-476).
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main arguments and how the Court dealt with the answers to each inquiry
will be described below.

i.

Anti-Commandeering Principle

As it had for the better half of a decade, New Jersey relied primarily
on two Supreme Court decisions supporting the argument that PASPA was
unconstitutional because it was effectively a violation of the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.43 It relied on New
York v. United States, in which the Court held a challenged federal law
unconstitutional because it ordered the State to regulate in accordance with
federal standards.44 It also relied on Printz v. United States, in which the
Court held a federal statute unconstitutional because it compelled state
officers to enforce federal law.45 New Jersey contended that any state law
that has the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or
partially repealing a prior prohibition, amounts to an authorization.46
Conversely, New Jersey argued that PASPA requires the states to maintain
their existing laws outlawing sports betting.47 The effect of PASPA,
therefore, was to compel state officers to enforce federal law, like in
Printz, thereby violating the anti-commandeering principle inherent in the
Tenth Amendment.48
Alternatively, the sports leagues attempted to frame the challenged
PASPA provision narrowly, claiming PASPA does not commandeer the
New Jersey State government because the provision lacked language
requiring affirmative action by the State.49 Distinguishing between
PASPA and the laws challenged in New York and Printz, the sports leagues
argued that the laws in those cases were invalid because they “told states
what they must do instead of what they must not do.”50 Therefore,
according to the sports leagues: “commandeering occurs ‘only when
Congress goes beyond precluding state action and affirmatively
commands it.’”51

43
See Murphy, supra note 40, at 1471. (The State relied primarily on New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
44
Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
45
Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
46
Id. at 1473 (“Petitioners argue that the anti-authorization provision requires States to
maintain their existing laws against sports gambling without alteration.”).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1478.
51
Id.
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The Court was unpersuaded by the sports leagues’ interpretation
requiring an “affirmative” federal command to the states.52 Instead, the
Court sided with New Jersey, finding that the PASPA provision
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling did violate the anticommandeering rule.53

ii.

Supremacy Clause

The sports leagues also defended PASPA’s anti-authorization
provision on the ground that it was a valid preemption provision under the
Supremacy Clause.54 That is, that the provision should preempt any New
Jersey state law on sports gambling.55 The Court noted that for the PASPA
provision to preempt state law it must: (1) represent the exercise of a power
conferred to Congress by the Constitution; and (2) the PASPA provision
must be best read as one that regulates private actors.56 Rejecting this
argument, however, the Court held that “the PASPA provision prohibiting
state authorization of sports gambling is not a preemption provision
because there is no way in which this provision can be understood as a
regulation of private actors.”57

iii.

Policy Disagreements

At the heart of New Jersey’s original suit to take down PASPA was
the state’s financial struggles resulting from operations like Atlantic City’s
casinos and horse racing tracks.58 However, Governor Christie’s potential
solution was a possible $600 million influx in additional revenue should
sports gambling be legalized, which could operate as at least a small fix to
the state’s budget crisis.59
Indeed, in an amicus brief filed in support of New Jersey, the
American Gaming Association (“AGA”) opined that, generally, “a legal
See id. at 1472 (explaining that precluding state action and requiring affirmative state
action are both subject to commandeering scrutiny because “[i]n either event, state
legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress.”).
53
Id. at 1478 (holding that “[t]he PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state
authorization of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule.”).
54
Id. at 1479.
55
Id.
56
See id. at 1480 (“Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on
private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal
law; and therefore, the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.”).
57
Id. at 1481 (emphasis added).
58
See Bob Considine, Could sports betting save New Jersey?, TRUE JERSEY (Aug. 9,
2010),
https://www.nj.com/insidejersey/index.ssf/2010/08/can_sports_betting_save_new_je.html
.
59
Id.
52
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sports-betting industry could generate up to $26.6 billion in total economic
impact every year though GDP increases, tax[] dollars, and over 150,000
well-paying American jobs.”60 Moreover, state governments would “be
able to capitalize on these benefits by, for example, directing new revenues
to law enforcement, social services, and other matters of vital citizen
interest.”61 Solely in Nevada, it was estimated that a fully mature sports
betting market generated around $4.9 billion in spending on sports
gambling in 2017.62
Moreover, it was evident that PASPA had not eliminated corrupt sport
match-fixing practices in its entirety, despite the law’s widespread
support.63 Thus, in spite of PASPA’s original intention to stop the spread
of state-sponsored sports gambling, New Jersey and its supporters also
argued that the statute effectively drove the sports gambling market
underground, while simultaneously taking tax revenue away from the
states and indirectly placing it into the hands of illegal offshore entities.64
To put the size of this underground market in context, the AGA estimated
that Americans illegally bet over $150 billion per year on U.S. sporting
events.65 The market is not only dense, but also well-organized: in a 2015
investigation, the New York Times uncovered over 100 gambling sites—
none of which were licensed by the state—connected to the internet at a
Piscataway, New Jersey data center.66 Thus, New Jersey posed the
question: if PASPA not only failed to attain the goals it set out to achieve,
but effectively promoted an underground market by inhibiting states’
ability to raise revenue, why was it still on the books?
Still, for years, the sports leagues and numerous lawmakers took
solace in the fact that PASPA was purportedly sustaining the integrity of

See Brief for American Gaming Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 18, Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1480 (Nos. 16-476, 16-477).
61
Id.
62
Minton, supra note 3.
63
See generally Eric Ramsey, Tennis Still Has A Betting Integrity Problem, We’re
Reminded At Wimbledon, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jul. 13, 2018, 8:25 PDT),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21922/tennis-integrity-wimbledon/,
(“Leaked
documents identify a ‘core group’ of 16 players ranked in the top 50, including Grand Slam
winners, repeatedly flagged for fixing. Some had been offered $50,000 or more to throw
matches. None faced discipline, and all were still competing at the time of the report.”).
64
See NCAA, supra note 23.
65
Brief for American Gaming Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
1, Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1480 (No. 16-476).
66
See Bogdanich, Glanz & Armendariz, Cash Drops and Keystrokes: The Dark Reality
TIMES,
of
Sports
Betting
and
Daily
Fantasy
Games,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/15/us/sports-betting-daily-fantasy-gamesfanduel-draftkings.html?module=inline (last visited Sep. 16, 2019).
60
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professional and collegiate athletics.67 Moreover, PASPA’s supporters
argued that the law would “protect sports from becoming a vehicle for
promoting gambling among teenagers, ensuring that the values of
character, cooperation, and good sportsmanship that have figured so
heavily in the growth of athletic competition throughout American history
were not significantly compromised.”68
While PASPA’s supporters believed their stance on the issue of
PASPA’s actual utility to be morally superior, the protections that the law
warranted to consumers may not have been so protective after all.69 Many
pundits hypothesize that the prohibitions of PASPA actually left
consumers without legal protections when placing illegal wagers on sports
and that PASPA created a more conducive environment for matchfixing.70

II. MURPHY’S IMMEDIATE IMPACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy has had an enormous impact
on sports betting in the United States. By the start of the 2019 calendar
year, seven states had regulated sports gaming industries, with over twenty
more such bills filed in 2019.71
The remainder of Part II will examine significant adaptations to sports
betting laws, beginning with Nevada, and continuing with the laws
adopted by states that were among the first to regulate sports betting
following the Murphy decision.72

A. Nevada
Nevada was the pioneer for legalized sports gambling.73 Riding the
success of Las Vegas’ newly legalized gambling market, Nevada became
the first state to legalize sports betting, which had previously operated in

See Dustin Gouker, Three Giant Lies Sen. Orrin Hatch Just Told About Sports Betting,
THE LINES (May 23, 2018), https://www.thelines.com/orrin-hatch-lies-on-sports-betting/.
68
See Bradley, supra note 5, at 6.
69
See Gouker, supra note 67.
70
Id.
71
Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Sep. 4,
2019, 10:02 PDT),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/.
72
The applicability of the figures and information provided in this section may only be
relevant as of August of 2019.
73
See Aaron Gray, The Vegas Era: Major Sports Betting Legislation in the USA (Part
II), SPORTS BETTING DIME, https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/guides/legal/sportsbetting-history-part-ii/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2019).
67
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underground and organized crime associations throughout the country.74
In 1949, sportsbooks (originally called “Turf Clubs”) began to pop up all
over Las Vegas.75 However, it was only fun and games for two years, at
which point the federal government got involved in Nevada’s sports
gambling industry for the first time.76
In 1951, Congress levied a 10% federal excise tax on Las Vegas
sportsbooks, which the books had to comply with to stay in operation.77
While a 10% tax on the sportsbooks profits alone would have been harsh,
this particular tax was on a sportsbooks’ entire “handle”78 (total betting
revenue), which meant that the books would have to pay a 10% tax as well
as pay their customers’ winning bets back after they settled.79 However, in
1974, Congress decreased the 10% tax to 2%, and again in 1984 from 2%
to 0.5%.80 Accordingly, the decreased burden on Nevada casinos allowed
the sportsbooks to generate more revenue than ever before.81

B. Delaware
In 2009, Delaware attempted to expand upon its already existing
lottery system to include expanded forms of its parlay product.82
Following the Court’s decision in Murphy, Delaware won the race to the
sports betting market.83 Delaware had reason to get on the ball early—the
state only has about one million residents, and its fiduciary budget is
heavily reliant on tourism from nearby states.84 According to Delaware’s
Director of Tourism, 17% of the state’s visitors participate in its gaming
industry.85 Thus, adopting a legalized sports betting scheme early on came
74

See id.
See id.
76
See id.
77
See id.
78
See generally Sports Betting Handle vs. Revenue, THE LINES (May 24, 2018),
https://www.thelines.com/sports-betting-handle-revenue/ (defining “handle” as “the total
amount of money wagered by bettors at a sportsbook over a given period,” and defining
“revenue” as “the amount of money a sportsbook retains from total handle after paying out
winners.”).
79
Gray, supra note 73.
80
Id.
81
See id.
82
Delaware
Sports
Betting,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/delaware (last updated Aug. 9, 2019).
83
See id. (“Delaware law permits sports betting, and became the first state outside of
Nevada to book a legal, single-game wager.”).
84
See Eric Ramsey, Welcome to Delaware Sports Betting: Live Updates as State Joins
Nevada With Single-Game Wagering, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (June 5, 2018, 8:47 PM),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20945/delaware-begins-booking-first-sports-betsoutside-nevada/.
85
Id.
75
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as both an immediate financial incentive for Delaware, as well as a
promotional opportunity for the state throughout the northeast.86
By June of 2018, three casinos were permitted to accept bets in
Delaware: Dover Downs, Delaware Park, and Harrington Raceway &
Casino.87 Yet, these casinos must deal with a tax structure very different
from the one used in Nevada.88 After winning bets are paid out, Delaware
casinos are required to share 12.5% of their sportsbook handle with
Scientific Games, the entity in charge of providing gambling products and
services to the state’s casinos.89 After paying Scientific Games, the casinos
are effectively taxed by Delaware at a 60% rate, because 50% of
sportsbooks’ winnings are directly taxed by the state, while an additional
10% goes towards supplementing horse racing purses from races run at
Delaware race tracks.90

C. New Jersey
While Delaware won the race to the sports betting industry postMurphy, New Jersey won best-in-show by taking full advantage of the
decision.91 On June 11, 2018, former Governor Christie’s dream of legal
sports wagering in the Garden State came to fruition when Governor Phil
Murphy signed the sports betting bill into law.92 Compared with
Delaware’s three casinos accepting bets, New Jersey features up to nine
casinos that can be accessed in person.93 In Atlantic City alone, six casinos
86

See id.
See Rick Maese, Delaware is the First New State to Bet on Sports Gambling, but it
POST
(June
5,
2018),
Might
Not
Pay
Off,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/06/05/delaware-first-to-bet-onsports-gambling-but-it-might-not-pay-off/?utm_term=.bc842b422948.
88
See Adam Candee, Is It ‘Revenue Sharing’ or High Taxes for Sports Betting? Ask
Rhode Island, Delaware How They Slice the Pie, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (July 3, 2018,
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are now accepting sports wagers.94 Moreover, New Jersey took full
advantage of its new law with online forums and a handful of mobile
betting apps, which can be accessed throughout the Garden State.95
Already, New Jersey’s online gaming industry has taken over retail venues
in total value of bets made.96 In November 2018 alone, a staggering 72%
of money wagered on sports in New Jersey came via mobile and online
channels.97
Sports wagering in New Jersey is overseen by the New Jersey Division
of Gaming Enforcement.98 Sports betting at traditional sportsbooks is
taxed at 8.5%, while entities accepting wagers online via URL’s and
mobile apps are taxed at a 13% rate.99 Of note, New Jersey overtook
Nevada for the highest monthly gaming handle generated in one state in
May and June of 2019.100 As evidenced by these awards, New Jersey has
seen the most immediate success from its victory in legalized sports
gaming, but the sustainability of that success may be threatened by
legalization attempts in nearby states with potentially large online sports
betting markets, such as Pennsylvania and New York.
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D. Mississippi
Mississippi officially became the fourth state (not including Nevada)
to offer single-game sports wagering on August 1, 2018, just in time to
accept wagers on the upcoming college football season.101 Mississippi
immediately gained a regional edge, becoming the first state in the
southeast to adopt legalized sports betting post-Murphy.102 The popular
MGM sportsbook opened wagering activities at popular casinos in Biloxi
and Tunica.103 However, mobile and online wagering is currently not
permitted outside of Mississippi’s licensed casinos and, following the
death of both Mississippi House Bill 1481 and Senate Bill 2667 in
February of 2019, this is likely to remain the case.104
Wagering within Mississippi is controlled by the Mississippi Gaming
Commission (“MGC”).105 Mississippi sportsbooks are required to pay a
12% tax on their hold after paying out winning bets, which is slightly
higher than the New Jersey rate.106 Breaking that down, casinos in
Mississippi pay 8% of their winnings to the state government and 4% of
their winnings to the local municipalities in which they are located.107

E. West Virginia
West Virginia was ahead of the game, enacting a sports betting law in
March 2018 that took effect once Murphy was decided.108 Thus, West
Virginia was among one of the first states to offer regulated sports
wagering following the decision, with its first bet paying out the day legal
sports betting was first offered on September 1st, 2018.109 At its launch,
West Virginia featured just one sportsbook, the Hollywood Casino in
Mississippi’s legal sports betting scheme came just in time to accept wagers on the
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Charlestown, in partnership with William Hill sportsbooks.110 Yet, as of
late December 2018, the state boasted five fully operative sportsbooks as
well as an important online sports wagering platform.111 Sports gaming
wagers in West Virginia are overseen by the state’s Lottery Commission
and are taxed by the state at a 10% clip.112

F. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania became the seventh state to begin accepting wagers on
sporting events in mid-November 2018, permitting wagers on both
professional and collegiate activities, as well as accepting bets both in
person and via mobile device platforms.113 Notably, the state’s Gaming
Control Board has come under scrutiny for the high tax rates it places on
sports betting when compared to other states.114 Seen as an avenue to help
supplement horse racing purses, as well as pension and health plans for
Pennsylvania’s horsemen, the state’s 36% tax rate dwarfs the rates of
Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi combined.115 Despite this heavy tax,
Pennsylvania bettors placed over $59 million in total sports wagers in July
of 2019, a new monthly high for the state, due in large part to online
wagering, which accounted for over two-thirds of all bets placed in the
state.116 Compare these figures with those of Pennsylvania’s casino
market, which has become the second-largest in the United States behind
only Nevada despite an astronomical 54% tax rate on slot revenue.117
According to state officials, Pennsylvania’s casinos have generated at least
$2.3 billion in slot machine revenue alone over each of the past eight
years.118
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G. Rhode Island
Rhode Island legislators signed a sports betting bill into law on June
22, 2018.119 The state’s gaming operations, which are overseen by the
Rhode Island Lottery, are limited to just two casinos, the Twin River
Casino in Lincoln and the Twin River Casino in Tiverton.120 Rhode Island
has perhaps the most interesting tax revenue split of any state to legalize
sports betting to this point: 51% of every dollar wagered in Rhode Island
sportsbooks goes back to the state’s treasury, and 32% goes to
International Game Technology, the partner of the state’s casinos helping
to operate sports betting.121 After those taxes are paid out, 17% of the
remaining sports betting revenue stays in the hands of the respective
casinos.122

III. LET’S TALK OVERSIGHT
A. Calls for Oversight: Arguments in Favor and Against
i.

Orrin Hatch and Chuck Schumer

Before sundown on the day that the Murphy decision was handed
down, Senator Orrin Hatch issued a public statement and memo
announcing his intent to submit federal legislation on sports betting.123 As
one of the architects of the now-defunct PASPA, Senator Hatch (R-UT)
seemed to make it his swan song to once again place his name on a federal
mandate on sports gambling.124 On August 23rd, Senator Hatch promised
on the Senate floor that a new piece of federal legislation would “kickstart” the federal discussion on sports betting, despite the fact that three
states were already running full steam ahead with their own legalized
sports gambling operations.125
Similarly, Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) authored a memo directed
at the Senate on August 29th, which outlined his proposed federal
119
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framework for sports betting regulation.126 Senator Schumer took the
position of an ‘everyman sports fan,’ arguing that federal oversight was
imperative to protect “the sports games we all love to watch[.]”127
Specifically, Senator Schumer gave three major suggestions in the
memo.128 First, he suggested the implementation of a legal sports betting
age, similar to age twenty-one for alcohol sales, and also suggested that
casinos be prohibited from advertising to young people.129 Second,
Senator Schumer recommended that entities accepting wagers on sporting
events should be required to share information and suspicious trends with
the leagues in order to “protect the integrity of the game[.]”130 Lastly,
Senator Schumer suggested that “official league data” should be required
to determine the outcomes of consumers’ wagers, as well as some level of
involvement for the major sports leagues in determining which betting
options private casinos and sportsbooks may offer.131 In other words, the
Senator suggested “protect[ing] consumers and individuals placing bets”
by creating one official database for each league that the sportsbooks
would be required to purchase and follow in setting odds for bettors.132

ii.

The American Gaming Association

The Senators’ suggestions were followed by immediate pushback
from numerous organizations.133 Namely, Sara Slane—the Senior Vice
President of Public Affairs for the AGA—took issue with each of the
Senators’ suggestions in a September 13, 2018 letter addressed to Senator
Schumer.134 Ms. Slane expressed the AGA’s disdain for the Senators’
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hands-on approach to an industry that had just taken its first steps in
decades toward liberation.135 She discussed the AGA’s position that there
was actually no need for federal oversight, further expressing the
sentiment that oversight can be achieved through “robust state
regulation.”136 Crucially, the AGA asserted that “there is neither a need
nor a legal precedent” to require sportsbook operators to purchase “official
league data.”137 Instead, Slane wrote that “[a] healthy market of accurate,
consistent sports betting data providers already exists and sportsbooks
already avail themselves of such services in the commercial market.”138
And this makes sense, too: one official data company is much more likely
to become corrupted and to set inflated prices that discourage competition
than is a variety of data providers like the market that currently exists.139
Lastly, Slane fought Schumer’s suggestion that leagues ought to be
involved in the types of wagers that sportsbooks would be allowed to
accept,140 arguing that sportsbook operators already have a significant
economic incentive to avoid offering bets that pose a significant risk.141

iii.

NBA, NFL, etc. Executives’ Approach

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy, the National
Basketball Association’s (“NBA”) Assistant General Counsel and Senior
Vice President Dan Spillane supplemented the New York State Senate’s
discussion before the Committee on Racing, Gaming, and Wagering with
testimony providing the NBA’s opinion on federal oversight for sports
gambling.142 Spillane pinpointed a few key components that should be
included in a comprehensive sports betting bill.143 First, he suggested that
such legislation should include transparency between gaming operators
and the leagues regarding information on wagers on their leagues.144
Specifically, Spillane suggested that gaming operators should be required
to (a) inform the sports leagues of unusual betting activity, and (b)
maintain centralized betting data to assist gaming operators in monitoring
135
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bets from one jurisdiction to the next.145 Next, Spillane suggested that
leagues should possess the right to restrict gaming operators from offering
certain wagers on their events.146 Furthermore, Spillane echoed the
NCAA’s policy argument in Murphy, calling for rigorous licensing
programs to ensure that sportsbook operators were properly vetted, as well
as age restrictions for consumers, and measures to address problem
gambling.147
Perhaps most importantly, Spillane suggested that the sports leagues
will inherently assume an increased risk as a result of an increase in wagers
on sports contests.148 The NBA suggested that in order “[t]o compensate
leagues for the risk and expense created by betting and the commercial
value our product creates for betting operators, it would be reasonable for
operators to pay each league one percent of the total amount bet on its
games.”149 This one-percent requirement is now commonly referred to as
“integrity fees.”150 Recently, integrity fees have been widely popularized
by the major sports leagues as a way for the leagues to find additional
profit in a world where it is now legal to wager on their product.151 In short,
integrity fees would provide the leagues with a set percentage commission
of the total bets wagered on their respective games in order to compensate
each league for the increase in the amount of time and money that they
will have to spend on data monitoring and integrity protocols.152

iv.

The “Other” September 27th Hearing

In late September 2018, while the vast majority of the nation was
captivated by the confirmation hearings of now-Supreme Court Justice
Brett Kavanaugh, a House Judiciary subcommittee was meeting just down
the hall of the Capitol Building.153 On the afternoon of September 27,
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2018, Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) provided his opening
remarks in a House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime hearing, the purpose
of which was to discuss the possibility of federal legislation to oversee
states’ authorization of sports gambling.154 There, Congressman
Sensenbrenner outlined four possible options for Congress to consider in
the coming months.155
First, Congress could once again attempt to ban sports betting
altogether.156 That is, to come up with a piece of legislation similar to
PASPA, without running afoul of any constitutional states’ rights.157
Reading Justice Alito’s opinion in Murphy, this is a possible option;
however, this option is the least plausible of the four at this juncture.158
Second, Congress could choose to maintain what has now become the
status quo in a post-Murphy world.159 That is, continue to allow the states
to regulate themselves on all issues relating to their own respective sports
betting operations.160 Maintaining the current sports betting climate would
agree with the values of organizations like the American Gaming
Association and many of the states that have already passed sports
gambling legislation, but would come to the chagrin of the professional
sports leagues, and certain Senators such as Hatch and Schumer.161
Third, Congress could create a meet-you-in-the-middle type of system
that poses minimal disruption to the status quo. This type of legislation
would impose required standards and restrictions on states should they
choose to authorize sports gambling operations.162 Simply put, Congress
could choose a route that results in minimal regulation through a means of
minimal standards and requirements that states must meet in order to
provide a healthy sports betting market.163 For now, it seems that this is
the most likely option, though there is criticism that even minimal federal
regulation is unnecessary.164 After all, many states would argue that most
of the regulations put into place by new legislation are already covered in
many of the states’ own sports betting laws.165
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Lastly, there is the option of full federal regulation of the sports betting
industry.166 A complete framework for federal oversight of the growing
sports betting industry theoretically has no bounds: mandated integrity
fees and official league data, age restrictions on state sponsored sports
betting, and a host of other requirements that could be imposed on the
states could be within Congress’ regulatory reach.167

B. A Discussion on Integrity Fees
To make a fully advised decision on which of the outlined
Congressional approaches is most warranted, a total grasp of the
intricacies of each approach is necessary. One of those intricacies is the
integrity fee, which would provide the sports leagues with a set percentage
commission of the total bets wagered on their respective leagues.168
According to Spillane, integrity fees are justified because a legal sports
betting market will force the leagues to invest time, effort, and resources
into compliance programs that include bet monitoring and investigating.169
This compensation would, in theory, help to alleviate any burden placed
on the leagues for the increase in capital and resources that they will have
to spend on increased data monitoring and integrity protocols.170
Proponents of integrity fees have provided many reasons in support of
such a fee.171 The most obvious reason being that integrity fees will help
the sports leagues offset the increase in resources they will have to allocate
toward compliance programs in response to the proliferation of sports
gambling.172 There are certainly costs associated with the rise in sports
betting volume that league offices will incur.173 If implemented correctly,
an integrity fee should theoretically provide an unquestionable increase in
overall integrity.174 However, before Congress places an integrity fee
requirement on sportsbooks across the country, we must ask: is there not
another way to recompense the sports leagues for their hardship?175 After
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all, don’t the sports leagues already stand to gain from a healthy sports
betting market in and of itself?176
While the leagues will not receive direct monetary compensation
from legal sports betting, a 2018 Nielsen Sports survey illustrates that, at
a minimum, the secondary effects of state-sponsored sports betting are
vast.177 Those effects can be broken down into two categories: revenue
from fan engagement and gaming-related revenue.178
Revenue from fan engagement would include increased revenue from
media rights, sponsorship, merchandise sales, and ticket sales.179 The 2018
Nielsen study estimated that in a legal sports betting environment, the NFL
would receive a $2.326 billion increase in total revenue, with $1.753
billion generated by fan engagement revenue and $573 million in gamingrelated revenue.180 The NBA would receive an extra $585 million, with
$425 million generated by fan engagement revenue and $160 million in
gaming-related revenue.181 The NHL figures are $216 million in total:
$151 million from more fan engagement and $65 million from gamingrelated revenue.182 And the MLB would receive an increase of $1.106
billion in total revenue, represented by an increase of $952 million in fan
engagement revenue and a $154 million in gaming-revenue.183 In total, the
study estimates that a fully healthy sports betting market would drive an
increase of $4.2 billion in profits for the four major professional sports
leagues combined,184 not including profits for the NCAA, where
Americans wagered $10.4 billion on March Madness alone in 2017.185
In contrast, various reports estimate that in a fully healthy sports
betting market, state-sponsored sportsbooks would take in about $200
billion in annual handle, or wagered bets alone.186 Using this figure, a one
percent integrity fee would amount to $2 billion that sportsbooks would
be required to hand over to the leagues each year from wagered bets
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alone.187 From December 2016 through November 2017, Nevada
sportsbooks had a handle of over $4.8 billion.188 Viewing this $2 billion
figure in light of the handle from 2016-2017 in Nevada sportsbooks, we
can estimate that a 1 percent integrity fee would allot $600 million to the
NCAA, $480 million to the MLB, $440 million to the NFL, $300 million
to the NBA, and $160 million to other sports.189 The MLB, for example,
would receive $480 million from an integrity fee to support increased
compliance costs.190 However, that $480 million figure pales in
comparison to the $1.106 billion the league would receive to just exist in
a healthy sports betting market.191

C. The End Result: The Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act
of 2018
On December 19, 2018, Senators Hatch and Schumer took the first
step in a long, drawn out process that could eventually result in
comprehensive legislation providing federal oversight to the expanding
legal sports betting market.192 The aim of the bill is not to ban sports
betting, but to “maintain a distinct [f]ederal interest in the integrity and
character of professional and amateur sporting contests.”193 While the bill
did not pass in 2018, Hatch—who retired from the Senate at the end of the
year—hoped that the bill would serve as a starting point for the 2019
Congress when it is time to pick up discussions and reintroduce the bill.
So, what does that starting point look like?
To start, legal sportsbooks that have already opened across seven
states, including sportsbooks in Nevada, would not be exempt from
complying with federal standards.194 Importantly, the bill would “[r]equire
that sports wagering operators use data provided or licensed by sports
organizations to determine the outcome of sports wagers through 2024,
187

Id.
David G. Schwartz, NEVADA SPORTS BETTING TOTALS: 1984-2018, at 2 (Las Vegas:
Center for Gaming Research, University Libraries, University of Nevada Las Vegas)
(2019).
189
Gouker, supra note 186.
190
Id.
191
American Gaming Association, supra note 175 (citing AM. GAMING ASS’N, HOW
MUCH DO LEAGUES STAND TO GAIN FROM LEGAL SPORTS BETTING? 4 (2018),
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/Nielsen%20Research%20%20All%204%20Leagues%20FINAL.pdf).
192
David Purdum & Ryan Rodenberg, What You Need to Know About the New Federal
Sports
Betting
Bill,
ESPN
(Dec.
20,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/25581529/what-need-know-sports-wageringmarket-integrity-act-swmia-2018.
193
Id.
194
S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103 (2018).
188

138

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. NN:115

and set requirements for data used thereafter.”195 The bill would also
establish a process to allow the sports leagues to request to restrict certain
sports wagers if they believe it would be necessary to protect the integrity
of the contest.196 Furthermore, the bill would “[p]rohibit sports wagering
by individuals younger than 21; athletes, coaches, officials, and others
associated with sports organizations; and individuals convicted of certain
federal crimes related to sports wagering.”197 Additionally, the bill’s final
page included a severability clause, which was a cause for debate in
Murphy.198 Under this provision, any invalidity in the bill would not render
the entire bill invalid, only that specific portion of the bill.199 Notably, the
bill failed to mention anything of substance regarding integrity fees.200
Despite bipartisan support, the bill did not enjoy significant support
from the professional sports leagues and the NCAA, but they were in the
minority.201 Lawmakers and the gaming industry alike chimed in to
express their disapproval.202 Specifically, Sara Slane of the AGA called
the bill the “epitome of a solution in search of a problem” and a “nonstarter for the gaming industry.”203

IV. THE SPORTS WAGERING MARKET INTEGRITY ACT OF 2018:
FLAWS AND SOLUTIONS
At the very least, Schumer and Hatch’s Sports Wagering Market
Integrity Act of 2018 (“SWMIA”) does serve as a starting place for a
broader conversation about sports betting.
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A. The Flaws
i.

Integrity Fees

A major talking point after the Murphy decision was the integrity fee
conversation. Just about any group you could find that was in favor of
federal oversight—most importantly, the professional sports leagues—
was also in favor of imposing an integrity fee on state-sponsored
sportsbooks.204 It could be inferred from the SWMIA that any talk of
integrity fees throughout the year received little Congressional support,
resulting in any language on integrity fees being stricken from the
SWMIA.205 I surmise that this omission will likely remain unchanged
moving forward, given that there has been no state that has included
integrity fees in its own sports wagering legislation. Furthermore,
evidence strongly suggests that the existence of legalized sports gambling
alone would bring plenty of profit to the sports leagues,206 thus, it seems
unlikely that any federal legislation would include an integrity fee
requirement.
It would seem that the major sports leagues should have plenty of
capital to uphold the integrity of their sports without imposing an
additional $2 billion in unwarranted integrity fees. Moreover, the
aforementioned figures are not the only bases for opposing integrity fees.
For starters, integrity fees would take away from state revenue, likely
making it a tough sell to get states to hand over a share of profits to the
leagues.207 Even if there were an integrity fee requirement, states would
inevitably be left with a choice: lower their tax rates in order to give the
leagues more money, or raise their rates to achieve their own initial profit
goals.208 Regardless, I expect that the costs associated with an integrity fee
would eventually just be passed off to consumers in the form of worse
odds and payouts, given that an integrity fee would likely reduce state
profits. If the goal is to transition sports betting to regulated markets, states
should be interested in keeping costs down. Integrity fees, whether in a
state sports betting bill or federal legislation, would not keep costs down.

ii.

Data Requirement

The most challenging provision of the SWMIA is likely the
requirement that sports wagering operators use data provided or licensed
by the sports leagues to determine the outcome of sports wagers through
204
205
206
207
208
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at least 2024.209 This requirement likely elicits a myriad of concerns, not
the least of which are constitutional. That is, a government mandate that
state-sponsored private organizations be restricted to certain sources of
information could run afoul of the First Amendment. Furthermore, aside
from the policy concerns related to hindering the marketplace of ideas
among private organizations, intuitive notions of economic competition
suggest that the openness of the current market for data providers is an
added incentive for sportsbook operators to access the best and fastest
information possible.210
In an alternative world where the sports leagues hold a monopoly over
official data, a two-folded problem is presented. First, a mandate that every
sports book contract with only the sports leagues for official data risks
granting the sports leagues the authority to set inflated, non-competitive
pricing. These inflated prices would not only stuff the pockets of the sports
leagues but would do so at the expensive of the sportsbooks’ net profit.
Accordingly, this decrease in profit margin would likely result in
sportsbooks passing the burden on to consumers. The eventual result of
such a dynamic could have an effect of drawing consumers away from the
regulated U.S. market, and toward illegal offshore markets.
Second, the current market for sports data is vast. It is hard to say how
many providers already exist. Assuming that sportsbooks operators want
to contract with the best service providers, it makes sense that this market
is so large. Conversely, a single-provider market is counterintuitive: it
likely disincentivizes efficiency of sports book operators and is likely
more prone to corruption. After all, it is much tougher to defraud an entire
market than a single provider.

iii.

Restrictions on Sports Wagers

Another feature of the SWMIA that is likely to be disputed is a
proposed provision allowing the sports leagues to restrict state-sponsored
sportsbooks from offering certain sports wagers.211 Of course, the
provision that made it into the bill is milder than what was championed
earlier in 2018.212 Under the proposed legislation, the decision of whether
to offer a certain sports wager would ultimately be at the discretion of each
state’s regulatory entity.213 Proponents of this provision, such as the sports
leagues and Senators Hatch and Schumer, justify it by suggesting that such
See S. 3793, supra note 197, at § 103(b)(5).
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discretion is necessary to ensure that the integrity of the sport is
maintained.214 In practice, however, I surmise that discretion to police
integrity is ambiguous to the extent that it could result in a league-friendly
ruling by the state regulatory agencies. For example, if the NFL requests
that a state’s sportsbooks not offer a prop bet on the length of the national
anthem before the Super Bowl, it is likely that the regulatory agency will
follow the NFL’s recommendation to not upset the NFL, rather than out
of caution for integrity.
Perhaps more importantly, the underlying rationale for this particular
provision stemmed from the fear that certain types of bets are susceptible
to manipulation in the betting market.215 Yet, this rationale is likely not
enough to uphold the provision for a couple of reasons. First, sports book
operators already have a significant economic incentive to avoid exposure
to the risk inherent in shady wagers. Second, restricting a certain bet that
has an ostensible customer demand would likely not go over too well with
those customers. If consumers demand the bet enough, the consumer will
simply seek out an illegal sports book operator who does not adhere to
these rules, and will accept the bet.216 Thus, a provision allowing the sports
leagues to restrict certain sports wagers counteracts the goal of federal
oversight to eliminate consumers running to the offshore market.217

B. The Solutions
The American Sports Betting Coalition believes that in a post-PASPA
world, one of the four core principles Congress should adhere to is to
“ensure a tax regime [that] does not undermine regulated sports betting
operations’ ability to compete against illegal and offshore operators.”218
State legislatures are more than capable of setting appropriate rates
according to their needs, as evidenced by the varying rates at which states
choose to tax their sportsbooks.219
However, state tax rates post-Murphy are not guaranteed to remain the
same, and a regime that leaves taxation entirely up the states could prove
dangerous. Take Pennsylvania for example: it has sustained its early
revenue success despite maintaining tax rates on sportsbooks as high as
36%. Is there anything preventing other states from imposing similarly
high rates? In fact, West Virginia state legislators are already realizing that
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they may be leaving profit on the table by preserving a tax rate of 10%.220
Therefore, a “race to the top” tax rate may be imminent.
Though great for state revenues, a race to the top tax regime would
certainly undermine sports betting operators’ ability to compete against
illegal and offshore operators. If other states across the east coast are
pressured to ante up their tax rates to keep up with Pennsylvania, I predict
that the costs will almost certainly be passed on to the consumers,
ultimately resulting in consumers fleeing for unregulated, offshore
operations.221 Thus, if the common goal is to eliminate illegal and offshore
sports book operators, advocates of PASPA and the SWMIA should
support federal oversight of state tax rates on regulated sportsbooks.
In summary, I contend that a revised edition of the Sports Wagering
and Market Integrity Act of 2018 should: (1) continue to exclude integrity
fees; (2) eliminate any provision granting the sports leagues the right to
restrict sportsbooks from offering certain wagers; (3) eliminate any
official league data requirement; and (4) include a maximum rate at which
states may levy taxes on their sports book operators.

V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision to end the federal ban on sports betting
is one that has already opened the door for hundreds of jobs and billions
of dollars in state tax revenue. Accordingly, social groups and business
organizations continue to advocate the position that sports betting should
now be left entirely up to the states post-Murphy. On the other hand, a
group of federal legislators continue to advocate for federal oversight of
state-sponsored sports betting, ultimately cumulating in The Sports
Wagering and Market Integrity Act of 2018. While the SWMIA’s
provisions are mostly counteractive to their sponsors’ goals, a decision to
forgo federal oversight is likely not warranted. Instead, Congress should
draft legislation that preserves for the states the decision of whether to
sanction sports betting, with the caveat that states who do choose to
sanction it must adhere to a maximum tax rate on its sportsbooks.
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